Moral Motivation  

Oleh:

Brink, David O.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 108 no. 1 (Oct. 1997), page 4-32.
Topik: Motivation; Moral Problem; Intellectual; NonCognitivism

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.4 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

One of the principal objectives of Michael Smith's clearheaded, vigorously argued, and rewarding book. The Moral Problem , is the reconciliation of morality's intellectual and practical dimensions. This reconciliation is no easy matter. The problem that occupies most of Smith's attention concerns moral motivation. Moral judgments are typically motivationally effacacious. If we think that motivation involves proattitudes, such as desires, we may conclude friom the motivational or "dynamic" aspects of morality that moral judgments express noncognitive attitudes, rather than beliefs. But this noncognitive conclusion may seem to miss intellectual aspects of morality, which cognitivism captures. To avoid it, it may seem that we need to reject the idea that moral judgment has some internal connection with motivation. But this may seem to abadon the practical dimension of morality. We could understand moral motivation in some new way that does not involve pro-attitudes, but this may seem hard to square with familiar assumption about the nature of intention action.

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