Incompatibilsm and the Avoidability of Blame  

Oleh:

Otsuka, Michael

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 108 no. 4 (Jul. 1998), page 685-701.
Topik: Blame; Moral; Filosofi; Incompatibilism; Principle of Avoidable Blame

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.7 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

In this article I address a topic that is foundation to moral philosophy: that of the conditions that must obtain if human beings are to be worthy of blame from wrong doing. My ambition is to provide one significant part of explanation of why no one would be worthy of balme if the universe were causally of determinism and blameworthiness can be presented in roughly the following form: Familiar argument for incompatibilism: 1.One is blameworthy for performing an act of given type only if one could have refrained from performing an act of that type. 2. If determinism is true, then one never could have refrained from performing acts whatever types that one has performed. 3. Therefore, if determinism is true, then one is never blameworthy for performing an act given type. The second premise of this argument is controversial. But I will not discuss it here. Rather, my focus will be on the first premise. The Principle of Alternate Possibilities that constitutes this premise went largely unchallenged before the publication nearly thirty years ago of Harry Frankfurt's Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility." In that article Frankfrut's presented an ingenious counterexample to this principle which, in the opinion of many, presents the most serious challenge to incompatibilism to date. Incompatibilists have responded to Frankfurt's challenge in a variety of ways.

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