Animal Research, Non-vegetarianism, and the Moral Status of Animals - Understanding the Impasse of the Animal Rights Problem  

Oleh:

Hon-Lam Li

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy vol. 27 no. 5 (Oct. 2002), page 589-615.
Topik: Animal Research; Animal Rights; Undecidability; Inter-Species Comparison of Utility
Fulltext: MM80V27N5P589.pdf (143.13KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: MM80.12 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

I offer some reasons for the theory that, compared with human beings, non-human animals have some but lesser intrinsic value. On the basis of this theory, I first argue that we do not know how to compare an animal's claim to be free from a more serious type of harm (e.g., death), and a human's claim to be free from some lesser type of harm (e.g., non-fatal morbidity). For we need to take account of these parties' intrinsic value, and their competing types of claim. Yet, there exists no known way for making such comparison, when a human's intrinsic value is higher than that of an animal, whereas the type of claim an animal has is morally weightier than the type of claim a human has. Second, I explain why utilitarianism is unhelpful in making such comparison. Third, in the case where some animals can be sacrificed for saving a larger number of humans, it is crucial to ask whether animals have the right to life, and I argue that this question is more perplexing than we might think. My conclusion is that the various difficulties mentioned above have a deeper source than we have so far acknowledged, and that this reflects that the moral reality is less tidy and more complex than many theories portray.

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