Reciprocal Tariff Imposition and Welfare in A Free Entry Oligopoly  

Oleh:

Tanaka, Y.

Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine
Dalam koleksi: JAPAN AND THE WORLD ECONOMY vol. 5 no. 1 (1993), page 73-90.
Topik: welfare; reciprocal tariff; imposition; welfare; free entry oligopoly

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ47 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

This paper considers a model of trade between two countries, and analyses the welfare effects of reciprocal imposition of an import tariff in a free entry Cournot oligopoly in which all firms produce a homogeneous good, and home and foreign markets are segmented. I shall show that if both countries impose a small specific tariff at the free trade equilibrium, then both countries will be better off under the condition that the inverse demand function is concave, and that an ad - varolem tariff imposed by both countries is more likely to improve welfare than the specific tariff.

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