On Intrinsic Value of Pleasures  

Oleh:

Feldman, Fred

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 107 no. 3 (Apr. 1997), page 448-466.
Topik: Nilai Intrinsik; Kesenagan; Hedonists; Hedonic. Moore; Pain

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.6 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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A great many moral philosophers finds themselves called upon to say something about the "hedonic thesis"- the view that "pleasure is intrisically good." Hedonist typically want to defend the hedonic thesis, since it lies at the heart of their theory of value. Some pluralists want to affirm nor deny the thesis but find it necessary to state and discuss it as they pursue some other project in moral philsophy. In spite of the prominence of the hedonic thesis in moral philosophies of all sorts, there disagreement about what it means. Some of this disagreement about what it means. Some of this disagreement turns on yet more fundamental disagreement about the nature of pleasure. As a result of such disagreement, different philosophers have provided different and nonequivalent interpretations of the hedonic thesis.

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