Deterrence and thE Fragility of Rationality  

Oleh:

Kroon, Frederick

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 106 no. 2 (Jan. 1996), page 350-377.
Topik: Rational; Immoralism; Fragility

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.3 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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The 1950s saw the birth of an influntial new position in strategic thinking about nuclear weapons. This position made two related claims. One the one hand, it conceded something that had become obvious to many: given the growth of nuclear arsenals, the actual use of nuclear weapons in a full-scale nuclear exchange would be suicidal and hence irrational. But it also contended that despite this-indeed, because of this-the seious threat to use such weapons could well be entirely rational. A threat to use such weapons in massive retaliatory response to their use by others would be rational, so the view held, if it was on balance likely to avert the start of such a suicidal and irrational nuclear exchange. (Most strategic thinkers probably thought that the threat would in that case be moral importance of the goal of peace and security served by the threat, but largely shied away from using moral categories to describe their views.) In its nost extreme form, this way of thinking came to be known as Assured Destruction or, in its famous symmetric form, as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). Because of its history and prominence, I shall call this "classical" policy of nuclear deterrence, although for much of the time I omit the description 'classical' since we won't be discussing others forms of nuclear defense in this article.

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