Internalism and the Good for a Person  

Oleh:

Rosati, Connie S.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 106 no. 2 (Jan. 1996), page 297-326.
Topik: Internal; Arguments; Judgment; Autonomy

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.3 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

Proponents of numerous recent theories of a person's good hold that a plausible account of the good for a person must satisfy exitence internalism. The label'existence internalism', hereafter 'internalism', refers to the general thesis that there is a necessary connection between motivation and normative status. The thesis tells us that something X can have a certain normative status N only if someone A ould be motivated by it in sense M. Thus depending upon the area of assessment, something can be a resaon or an obligation or a value of a certain kind only if that thing could appropriate person or persons. Proponents of internalist accounts of a person's good hold that something can be intrisically, nonmorally good for an indivual person A only if she herself would desire it (or desire to desire it), at least under suitably ideal conditions.

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