Doing & Allowing  

Oleh:

Scheffler, Samuel

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 114 no. 2 (Jan. 2004), page 215-240.
Topik: Responbilty; Philosphers; Moral

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.17 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Many philophers have said, though some consequentialists have denied, that people have a greater responsibilty, in general, for what they do than for what they merely allow fail to prevent. There is little doubt that some idea of this sort has an important role to play in ordinary moral thought. I say "some idea of this sort" because there is considerable disagreement about how best to characterize the distinction on which the idea rest. Many philosophers have tried to make the idea more precise and have put forward alternative formulations that revolve around different but overlapping distinctions. Among the candidate distinctions between doing and allowing, between doing and letting happen, between doing and failing to prevent, between action and inaction, between acts and omissions, between positive agency and negative agency, between what one does to another person directly and what merely happens to that person as a result of what one does, and so on. I will not attempt in yhis article to adjudicate among these different candidate distinctions.b What I will instead try to show is that, despite the absence of any consensus about which of the candidates is to preffered, our practice of treating one another as responsible agents requires us to make some distinciton of this kind.

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