Moral Deliberation, Nonnormal Ends, and The Virtous Agent  

Oleh:

Isaacs, Tracy ; Jeske, Diane

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 107 no. 3 (Apr. 1997), page 489-500.
Topik: Moral; Nature Reasons; Agent; Permissibility

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.6 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

Is there something unattractive about the moral agent who maintains, in all of her deliberationa and motivations, an overriding commitment to doing what morality requires? In recent years some have said that agents who are primaly concerned with morality requires? In recent years some have said that agents who are primaly concerned with morality will be dull and uninteresting persons whom we have no reason to emulate or to want as our friends. Others have gone further, claiming that agents whose overriding reasons for action are always explicitly moral will be unable to realize many goods, including the goods of various types of intimacy that give meaning and subtances to our lives. Common to each criticism is the claim that the life of the ideal moral agent will be impoverished. These critics urge that instead of allowing morality to dominate all of our deliberations, we should be sure that it is "kept in its place."

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