Hobbesian Public Reason  

Oleh:

Ridge, Michael

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 108 no. 3 (Apr. 1998), page 538-568.
Topik: Hobbesian Public Reason; Alternative Approach

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.7 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Thomas Hobbes observed that human interaction naturally generates destructive conflict. To reap the benefits of human interaction while constraining the destructiveness of such conflict, many have urged that we need a conception of public reason, where “public reason” is understood as reasoning in a special way about a distinctively public set of issues. Many philosophers have remarked that the way we reason about distinctively public issues is (or, at least, ought to be) importantly different from the way in which a lone individual would (or ought to) reason about an issue that is not so distinctively public. For example,John Rawis argues that when reasoning about what he calls “constitutional essentials,” citizens should not appeal to their full comprehensive views, but instead should deliberate only in terms of public values.’ One might hope that a theory of public reason could explain this distinction between public and nonpublic reason, and, perhaps, explain it in a way that both demonstrates how public reason might be justified and gives us the resources to criticize any particular instance of such reasoning. A particularly Hobbesian motivation for such a theory is the idea that everyone’s relying only on the individualistic mode of reasoning while interacting with one another guarantees destructive conflict and a life that is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.

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