Why Idealize  

Oleh:

Enoch, David

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 115 no. 4 (Jul. 2005), page 759-787.
Topik: Idealisasi; Roderick Firth; Natural Answer; Possible Answer

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.20 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

Roderick Firth claims that ethical truth is not determined or constituted by what we nonideal as we are want or choose, but by what ideal observers (that is, observers who are omniscient, omnipercipient, disinterested, dispasionate, consistent, and normal in other responses. This, he argues, is just what the truth of ethical claims such as "x is rights" consists in; something's beings right just is its being such as tobe chosen by the (or an) ideal observer. Peter Raiilton argues that what his ideal self (one who is "fully and vividly informed about himself and his circumstances, and entirely free of cognitive errors of lapses of instrumental rationality") would choose it for one. Bernard Williams believes that we have reason to do not necessarily what we desire, but ?(perhaps roughly speaking) what we would desire under suitable conditions (after rational deliberation, which includes the elimination of false beliefs, the introduction of some true ones, and some exercises of imagination).

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