Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason  

Oleh:

Setiya, Kieran

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 117 no. 4 (Jul. 2007), page 649-673.
Topik: Kongnitif; Instrumental; Pendapat; Kant; Gilbert Harman; Jay Wallace

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.23 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Despite Kant's insistence that the hypothetical imperative "requires no special discussion "since" as regards the volition. [it is] analytic,' instrumental reason has come to seem problematic. On the one hand, it seem right to say that one should take the necessary means to one's ends. On the other hand, there are circumstances in which one shpuld not take the means, end even ones in which there is no reason to do so at all. Imagine that I embark upon a thoroughly irrational prohject: I intend to count the blades of grass in my garden. Each day, I wake at six and kneel on the lawn with my magnifying glass, counting away. Despite my intention, however, I do not take what I know to be the necessary means.

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