Zimmerman on Culpable Ignorance  

Oleh:

Montmarquet, James

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 109 no. 4 (Jul. 1999), page 842-845.
Topik: Culpably; Ignorance; Common Sense

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.9 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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The bare bones of Zimmerman's argument are these (cf.pp.414-15): (i) to be ignorant of X is lack an appropriate belief with respect to X. (ii) We are never directly in control with respect to whether we have an appropriate belief. (iii) Without direct control with respect to X, we can have at most indirect responsibility for our ignorance. But, of course, (iv) if we have indirect responsibility with respect to X, there must be some suitably related Y, with respect to which we have direct responsibility and, by (iii), direct control. So now the question becomes this: is there any such Y? Zimmerman's argument is that if there is, it must be something of whose wrongness we are not ignorant.

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