Detail Firm-Specific Human Capital and Optimal Capital Structure   Oleh:  Jaggia, Priscilla Butt ; Thakor, Anjan V. Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW vol. 35 no. 2 (1994), page 283-308. Topik: HUMAN CAPITAL; firm - specific; human capital; structure Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: II49 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel We consider the moral hazard in managers undersupplying imperfectly-marketable firm - specific human capital. Firms may cope by granting long - term wage contracts that protect managers against employment termination. Although ex ante efficient, these contracts may be ex post inefficient when managerial ability is discovered to be low. Precommitted firms must honor these contracts, unless there is ownership transfer that permits their legal invalidation. Bankruptcy is one such transfer mechanism. Since managers anticipate the contractual consequence of bankruptcy, leverage worsens moral hazard ; this cost provides a counterbalance to the debt tax shield and leads to an optimal capital structure. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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