Moral Overridingness and Moral Subjectivism  

Oleh:

Valentine Shriffrin, Seana

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 109 no. 4 (Jul. 1999), page 772-794.
Topik: Moral; Ethics; Subject; Claim

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.9 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

Increasingly, claims of morality's overridingness are resisted, especially by those who regard moral reasons as, in an important sense, subjective. These theorists believe that moral considerations provide reasons for a person only if they appeal to independent aspects of her psychology, character, or life, such as her aims, projects, and relationships. But they doubt that these subjective, reason-grounding, factors will reliably be strong enough to guarantee that all-things-considered moral requirements will always override conflicting considerations.

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