Permissibilty and Practical Inference  

Oleh:

Hanser, Matthew

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 115 no. 3 (Apr. 2005), page 443-470.
Topik: Ethics; Permisibility; Inferential

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.20 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Many are drawn, at least initially, to the view that an agent's reasons for acting have a direct bearing on whether he acts permissibly. Anumber of influential philosophers, haowever, have argued that this view is incorrect and that its appeal must derive from sort of confusion. According to these philosphers, an agent's reasons for acting may reveal the quality of his character or help determine the extent to which he is at fault for, or deserves praise or blame for, acting as he does, but rarely, and then only indirectly, bear on whether he acts permisibly. This latter view naturally recommends itself if one takes acting impermissibly to be a matter of doing something againts which a decisive moral case can be made, even if only in retrospect. Different moral theories give different accounts of what might constitute a decisive moral case againts acting in a certain way, but all agree that whether a case can be made againts acting in a certain way is independent of any agent's actual grounds for acting in that way.

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