Detail Compensation and Transfer Pricing in A Principal-Agent Model   Oleh:  Besanko, David ; Sibley, David S. Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW vol. 32 no. 1 (1991), page 55-68. Topik: PRICING; compensation; transfer pricing; principal -agent model Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: II49 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel This paper studies transfer prices and compensation mechanisms in a principal -agent model with moral hazard and private information by the agent. Production requires unobservable effort by the agent and a purchased input. In general it is optimal for the principal to create an internal market for the input and charge the agent a tax or subsidy which differs from the market price. Conditions are found under which the optimal compensation function is given by the difference between a nonlinear "revenue" function depending only on output and a nonlinear transfer pricing function which depends only on the amount of the purchased input. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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