What Equality of Opportunity Could Not Be  

Oleh:

Risse, Mathias

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 112 no. 4 (Jul. 2002), page 720-747.
Topik: Equality; Roemer's; Opportunity Algorithm

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.14 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

This study concerned with John Roemer's Equality of Opportunity. I argue that his theory is committed to compatibilism but that one of its central claims is plausible only within a libertarian view on the free-will problem. Thus Roemer's theory is troubled by a deep structural incoherence and should be rejected as an account of equality of opportunity. Let me briefly introduce some background to Roemer's theory. Contemporary egalitarians face two major challenges: first, they need to explicate what is to be equalized among indiduals and thereby to provide a persuasive conception of treating people as equals. Second, they need to illuminate the relative importance of equality vis-a-vis other values. Much recent work regarding the first challenge focuses on accommodating the significance of choice and responsbility within egalitarian accounts.

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