Reasons, Responsibility, and Reliance: Replies to Wallace, Dworkin, and Deigh  

Oleh:

Scalon, T.M.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 112 no. 3 (Apr. 2002), page 507-528.
Topik: Motivation; Desire; Reasons; Ethics; Irrationality; Responsibility; Reliance

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.14 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

Reasons, Desires, and Motivation In chapter 1 of What We Owe Each Other, I make several claims about reasons and motivation which are perhaps not as clear as they might have been, in part because I find the notion of motivation itself rather unclear. First, I claim that if an agent is rational, then the fact that she sees some consideration as a reason for acting in certain way, and her so acting. There are conditions that must be present in order for an agent's taking something to be a reason to lead to the formation of an intention and to subsequent action. It is necessary, for example, that agent not be rendered unconscious, physically intefered with, or distracted by other thoughts. But what is not necessary, in my view, is the presence of some futher "motivating" state of desire, over and above the judment-sensitive attitude of taking some consideration to be a reason. Of course, that attitude itself, just insofar as it is capable of explaining action, may be counted as a desire in the board sense in which that term is often used.

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