Contractualism and Normativity of Principles  

Oleh:

Drowkin, Gerald

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 112 no. 3 (Apr. 2002), page 471-482.
Topik: Scalon Theory; Normativity; Moral; Ethics; Rossian Theory

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.14 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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When I ask myself what reason the fact that an action would be wrong provides me with not to do it, my answer is that such action would be one that I could not justify to others on grounds I could except them to accept.” Scalon advances his contractarian theory in order to defend a view about nature of moral reasoning and its reason-giving force. Judgments of right and wrong, in his view, are claims about reasons for accepting or rejecting principles under certain conditions. I want to explore in this essay some of the implications and diffuclties, the streghts and weakness of this view. In a famous passage, Hume sets out a problem for ethics: “ Take any action allow’d to be vicious. Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find the matter of fact, the real existence, which you call vice. In whatever way you take it, you find only certains passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entrirely escapes you, as long as you consider object.” Hume, of course, thought that we have to turn our attention from the object to the objector. It is the sentiment of disapprobation in the breast of the beholder that expains the viciousness of the deed. Hume was a subjectivisist.

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