Liberal Equality and Ethics  

Oleh:

Clayton, Matthew

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 113 no. 1 (Oct. 2002), page 8-22.
Topik: Liberal Equality

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.15 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Dworkin’s conception of distributive justice, equality of resources, requires equality in the distribution of impersonal resources and compensation for personal resource deficits, or their consequences, to be determined by a fair hypothetical insurance scheme. Among other things, that conception offers a recognizably liberal account of interpersonal comparison for the purposes ofjustice. Consider the envy test, for example. Dworkin cites the envy test as a test for equality in the distribution of impersonal resources, such as wealth, land, occupation, and material goods. The test is satisfied if no one prefers anyone else’s bundle of impersonal resources to her own.’ The attractions of the envy test within a liberal conception of equality are evident. First, it conforms to a widely held egalitarian view that an individual is disadvantaged if she enjoys less wealth than others because of the circumstances in which she lives (e.g., living in an area with less fertile land than others enjoy), rather than because of her ambitions. If Alice and Buff both hold the same goals but Alice faces a more propitious material environment in which to pursue hers, then both would prefer to be in her position. The envy test highlights those kinds of inequality as unjust.

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