Arrow’s Theorem, Indeterminacy, and Multiplicity Reconsidered  

Oleh:

Risse, Mathias

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 111 no. 4 (Jul. 2001), page 706-734.
Topik: Majority Rule; Condorcet's Paradox; Arrow's Theorem

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.12 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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In early 1652, the committee for the governance of the Spanish royal household considered the vacancy in the office of aposentador mayor de palacio, a function combining artistic and administrative duties. The five committee members evaluated four candidates, among them Diego de Velázquez. When each of them submitted a ranking of the candidates to the king, Velázquez was ranked second by one committee member, third by two, and fourth by another two. Had the king wanted to derive a group ranking from the individual rankings, he would have faced a problem of aggregation. Social choice theory explores questions of aggregation formally. One of its branches starts with individual preference rankings (such as those of the committee members with respect to the candidates) and investigates possibilities of deriving collective preference rankings from them in accordance with reasonable and natural conditions. More precisely, this branch of social choice theory investigates which sets of such conditions on aggregation can be satisfied simultaneously. Fortunately, the king appointed Velázquez without further ado and despite his unflattering placements, but twentieth-century political philosophers need to look more closely into questions of aggregation.

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