Rejecting Ethical Deflationism  

Oleh:

Ross, Jacob

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 116 no. 4 (Jul. 2006), page 742-768.
Topik: Penolakan; Deflationary; Hedonism; Asceticism

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.11 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

One of perennial challenges of ethical theory has been to provide an answer to anumber of views that appear to undermine the important of ethical questions. We may refer to such views collectively as "deflationary ethical theories." These include theories, such as nihilism, according to which no action is better than any other, as well as relativistic to which no ethical theory is better than any other. In this article I present a new response to such deflationary ethical views. Drawing a distinction between acceptance and rejection, on the one hand, and belief and disbelief, on the other, I argue that we have strong reason to reject these theories, even if we do not have reason to disbelieve them.

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