Does Consequentialism Make Too Many Demands, or None at All?  

Oleh:

Hurley, Paul E.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 116 no. 4 (Jul. 2006), page 680-706.
Topik: Reflection; Hobbesian; Kantian; Tradisi; Moral

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.11 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Consequentialism has, since its inception, faced persitent challenges of excess: it is charge, too confining, and too alienating to offer a plausible alternative moral theory. Defenders typeically concede that consequentialist moral theory is indeed extremely demanding, alienating, but they deploy a range of defenses againts such charges. Some look for patners in guilt, arguing, for example, that typical alternatives are no less extreme in relevant respects. Others, while conceding that the theory is extreme, argue that it is less extreme than might be thought; indeed, that it is not implausibly extreme. Still others bite the bullet, allowing that theory is counterintuitively extreme along some or all of these dimensions but maintaining that we are nonethless driven to embrace these counterintuitive results by theoretical reflection.

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