Kantian Rigorism and Mitigating Circumstances  

Oleh:

Schapiro, Tamar

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 117 no. 1 (Oct. 2006), page 32-57.
Topik: Kantian Rigorism; Mitigating Circumstances

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.22 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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A task facing any moral theory is to account foe both the rigidity and the flexibility of moral rules. It is natural to think of moral rules as being both uncompromising across some range of core cases and open to modification or exception at the margins. Utilitariansm and Kantianism face complementary challenges when it comes to justifying this intuition. Utilitarianism threatens too much flexibility; critics argue that the theory would require us to break our promises, tell lies, and condemn the innocent whenever doing so happens to be expedient. Kantianism, by contrast, seems too rigid. When a murderer comes to the door askingthe whereabouts of his intended victim, it seems morally muopic to refrain from lying to him out of a sense of duty. In general, utilitarianism appears to be more attractive than Kantianism in cases that are in some sense marginal or exceptional, cases where we are inclined to depart from our ordinary standards in the face of mitigating circumstances. But Kantianis seems more attractive in what we might call core cases, cases where we are inclined to keep our promises or tell the truth "on principle," independent of any implicit or explicit calculation of the benefit to be achieved or the harm to be averted by doing so.

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