Position-Relative Consequentialism, agent-Centered Options, and Supererogation  

Oleh:

Portmore, Douglas W

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 113 no. 2 (Jan. 2003), page 303-332.
Topik: Position-Relative Consequentialism; Agent-Centered Options; Supererogation

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.15 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

Lihat Detail Induk

Isi artikel

According to commonsense morality, we often have an agent-centered option, an option either to safeguard our own personal interest or to sacrifice those interests for the sake of the impersonal good. In such cases, sacrificing one's interests is supererogatory; although it is what one has most moral reason to do, it is not what one is morally required to do. These commonsense intuitions seem incompatible with maximizing act which agents are always morally t\required to bring about the best available state of affairs. Nevertheless, I will argue that a certain form of consequentialism (namely, position-relative consequentialism) can accommodate both agent-centered options and supererogatory acts. This conclusion is surprising in itself, but even more surprising is how I arrive at it. I argue that anyone genarally concerned to accommodate our pretheoretical moral intuitions will have to give a certain account of agent-centered options and supererogatory acts and that this account is the very one that allows for the consequentialists to accommodate both. So my article should be of interedt not just to those concerned with the tenability of consequentialism but to anyone interested in giving a coherent account of our pretheoretical moral intuitions.

Opini Anda

Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini!

Kembali