The Independent Value of Freedom  

Oleh:

Carter, Ian

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Ethics: An International Journal of Social Political and Legal Philosophy vol. 105 no. 4 (Jul. 1995), page 819-845.
Topik: Kebebasan; Politik Liberal; Nilai Intrisik; Defense

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE44.2 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

In this article I present a defense of the view that freedom is valuable as such, or what I call “independently valuable.” My motive for doing so is to justify a growing interest that I have encountered among contemporary political philosophers and welfare economists in the idea of “measuring” freedom-more specifically, in the question of whether, how far, and in what ways we can make sense of the idea of one individual having “more freedom” than another, or “a certain amount of freedom.” In opposition to this growing interest, there is a tendency among Rawisian liberals to reject the idea that freedom is valuable as such. These theorists manage to avoid the problem of the quantifiability of freedom, but, I believe, at a cost which they fail fully to recognize. Liberals do have important reasons for seeing freedom as valuable as such and, therefore, ought at least to grapple with the problems that this raises, even if such reasons must eventually be overridden.

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