Do Formal Contracts and Relational Governance Function as Substitutes or Complements ?  

Oleh:

Poppo, Laura ; Zenger, Todd

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Strategic Management Journal vol. 23 no. 8 (2002), page 707-726.
Topik: GOVERNANCE; outsourcing; trust; transaction cost economies; IT; contracts; relational governance

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: SS30.9 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

Relational exchange arrangements supported by trust are commonly viewed as substitutes for complex contracts in interorganizational exchanges. Many argue that formal contracts actually undermine trus and thereby encourage the opportunistic behaviour they are designed to discourage. In this paper, we develop and test an alternative perspective that formal contracts and relational governance function as complements. Using data from a sample of information service exchanges, we find empirical support for this proposition of complementarity. Managers appear to couple their increasingly customized contracts with high levels of relational governance (and vice versa). Moreover, this inter dependence underlies their ability to generate improvements in exchange performance. Our results concerning the determinants of these governance choices show their distinct origins, which further augments their complementarity in practice.

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