Pay Dispersion and Workforce Performance : Moderating Effects of Incentives and Interdependence  

Oleh:

Shaw, Jason D. ; Gupta, Nina ; Delery, John E.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Strategic Management Journal vol. 23 no. 6 (2002), page 491-512.
Topik: pay; compensation; organizational performance; dispersion

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: SS30.9 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

The compensation literature is replete with arguments, but lacking in empirical tests, regarding the effects of pay dispersion on organizational outcomes. Pay dispersion may increase effort and provide incentives for high workforce performance levels, but may also inhibit cooperation and goal orientaton among employees. Drawing on several theoretical perspectives (individual motivation, institutional theory, organizational justice, and neo classical economics), this study predicts that pay dispersion will be associated with higher levels of workforce performance when accompanied by formal individual incentive systems and independent work, while pay compression is desirable int he absence of individual incentive systems and when work is interdependent. Survey research studies in two industrial sectors (the motor carrier and concrete pipe industries) were conducted to address these issues. Interactive regressio results were generally supportive of the predictions across several measures of workforce performance (accident rates, safety violations, and productivity). Implications of these studies for strategy implementation int erms of compensation theory and practice are addressed.

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