Managing Foreign Subsidiaries : Agents of Headquarters, or An Interdependent Network ?  

Oleh:

O'Donnell, Sharon Watson

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Strategic Management Journal vol. 21 no. 5 (2000), page 525-548.
Topik: network; foreign subsidiaries; agency theory; interdependence; multinational corporations

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: SS30.5 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

In this study, two different theoretical perspectives are used to develop sets of hyptoheses regarding the mechanisms used to manage foreign subsidiaries of multinational coporations. First, agency theory seves as the basis for a model that predicsts the use of monitoring mechanisms and incentive compensation. Then, it is argued that these mechanisms are insufficient for managing subsidiaries characterized by high levels of intra - firm international interdependence, the management of which is critical to many of today's complex global firms. A seconf set of hypotheses is argued, linking international interdependence to several social control mechanisms. Primary and secondary data from U. S. based multinational corporations were used to test both sets of hypotheses. The results indicate that agency theory, although a useful foundation for studies of control within MNCs, is limited in its ability to explain fully the phenomenon of foreign subsidiary control, however, the model based on intra - firm interdependence had much greater predictive ability.

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