Detail Government interventions under asymmetric information Bibliografi Author: Boadway, Robin (Advisor); Bernhardt, Dan (Advisor); Mongrain, Steeve Topik: ECONOMICS; GENERAL|POLITICAL SCIENCE; PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION Bahasa: (EN )    ISBN: 0-612-38321-0     Penerbit: QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY AT KINGSTON (CANADA)     Tahun Terbit: 1999     Jenis: Theses - Dissertation Fulltext: NQ38321.pdf (0.0B; 1 download) Abstract This thesis consists of three main chapters plus an introductory chapter. Chapter one highlights the trade offs between efficiency and insurance in constructing an unemployment insurance system. Such a system reduces the cost of laying off workers but can also encourage layoffs, leading to more unemployment. It has been advocated that, in order to dampen this increase in unemployment, the government should finance unemployment insurance with an experience rated tax. Here we will develop a model where competitive firms offer long-term contracts to risk-averse workers. In an economy with asymmetric information about employee's productivity we will show that an experience rated unemployment insurance program cannot increase the wealth of unemployed workers without increasing unemployment. Chapter two looks at the impact of unemployment insurance on the accumulation of human capital. Given a two-periods horizon, workers can invest in either general or specific human capital. Competition in second period hiring between firms leads to higher wages for workers with general human capital, but also makes it harder for a firm to extract rents from these workers. If a firm has to lay off some workers, it will prefer to lay off workers with general human capital first. In this environment, multiple equilibria are possible. Equilibrium can either involve all workers investing in general human capital, or all workers investing in specific human capital. Because general human capital is transferable between firm, this type of investment Pareto dominates investment in specific human capital. We will examine how the introduction of unemployment insurance can reduce the level of specialization by workers and lead to an increase in the acquisition of general education. Finally, chapter three devotes attention to amnesties. One of the costs of anticipated amnesties is current and future non-compliance with the law. Efficient enforcement policies may therefore be modified when an amnesty is offered. In this chapter we will look at the conditions under which offering an amnesty can be efficient. We will also look at the optimal level of enforcement in presence of amnesties. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Lihat Sejarah Pengadaan  Konversi Metadata   Kembali

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