Detail The effects of conflicting accountability on auditors' decision behaviors in single-issue and multiple-issue decision events Bibliografi Author: Jensen, Kevan Lee ; Knechel, W. Robert (Advisor) Topik: BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION; ACCOUNTING Bahasa: (EN )    ISBN: 0-599-82365-8     Penerbit: UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA     Tahun Terbit: 2000     Jenis: Theses - Dissertation Fulltext: 9976554.pdf (0.0B; 3 download) Abstract One of the most common and most fundamental performance pressures auditors face is accountability. Current research suggests that auditors who feel accountable to someone else often change the way they make decisions. Unfortunately, current research has focused on accountability effects under simple accountability, where the auditor is accountable to a single party. Auditors often find themselves accountable to multiple parties simultaneously. In many cases this may result in conflicting accountability, where multiple evaluative parties prescribe mutually exclusive behaviors, forcing auditors to make decisions under conditions of conflict. This study examines auditors' behaviors under conflicting accountability by developing a model of decision making under accountability, and then by using two laboratory experiments to test several hypotheses suggested by the model. Conflicting accountability was hypothesized to motivate auditors to use more complex decision processing and to use various decision tactics to maintain identity images. Conflicting accountability was also hypothesized to reduce the biases typically observed under simple accountability. Experiments 1 and 2 examined auditor behavior in single-issue and multiple-issue decision events respectively, using 70 managers and partners from large international accounting firms as subjects. The results of the experiments generally supported the hypotheses. In the single-issue experiment, conflicting accountability appears to have motivated subjects to increase the complexity of their decision processing throughout the decision event. Subjects under conflicting accountability also were more likely to resolve the ambiguous issue using compromise—a distributive tactic. In the multiple-issue experiment, subjects under conflicting accountability tended to resolve the two ambiguous issues by trading off issues—an integrative tactic. And regardless of the number of issues, subjects under conflicting accountability were more likely to try to reduce their personal responsibility for the decision(s) by consulting with other members of their audit firms. Finally, there is weak evidence that conflicting accountability may reduce decision biases observed in single-issue decision events under simple accountability. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Lihat Sejarah Pengadaan  Konversi Metadata   Kembali

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