Detail Effects of government policies on the banking system Bibliografi Author: Druck, Pablo Fabian ; Vegh, Carlos A. (Advisor) Topik: ECONOMICS; FINANCE Bahasa: (EN )    ISBN: 0-599-81946-4     Penerbit: University of California     Tahun Terbit: 2000     Jenis: Theses - Dissertation Fulltext: 9976239.pdf (0.0B; 2 download) Abstract This dissertation includes three chapters, all of them related to the effects of government policies on the banking system. Chapter 1 shows how an insurance scheme eliminates the externality generated by a government bail out policy. As an example, this chapter analyzes the case of liquidity risk, defined as an unexpected cash withdrawal, and it presents a scheme to deal with this risk. This scheme works as an insurance where each bank pays a premium depending on the bank's risk. Besides the insurance scheme, a competitive tool to deal with liquidity risk is the existence of a lender of last resort. This chapter introduces a lender of last resort and it shows what the optimal punitive interest rate is, which is derived from the model developed in this chapter. In addition, a new procedure is developed to estimate the social cost of a bank crisis which is different from the net transfer from the government to the banking sector and independent of the existence of the crisis. Chapter 2 proposes theory and evidence on the relationship between inflation and the bank's portfolio allocation. The proposed idea rationalizes what Rodriguez (1992) pointed out with respect to the Central Bank of Argentina, behaving as a “borrower of first resort”, where banks reallocated their investment from the private sector to government bonds. Theoretically, this chapter studies the behavior of risk-neutral financiers in a world in which monitoring costs, and limited liability on the part of firms, leads to credit rationing equilibria. In light of the well established relation between inflation and changes in relative prices, the theoretical model rationalizes the relationship between inflation and the allocation of capital in the banking system. Chapter 3 presents a friendly framework to analyze the solvency of banks. It allows, first, to combine different characteristics of the financial system such as: (i) holding assets whose risk can be diversifiable and/or non-diversifiable, (ii) moral hazard, and (iii) capital requirements. And, second, to study the relation between these combinations and the bank's solvency. As a result, this chapter shows that under certain institutional arrangements, despite the fact that banks face different types of risk (e.g. liquidity risk), these financial institutions are solvent at every moment. In addition, this framework allows to study the welfare properties of the equilibrium. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Lihat Sejarah Pengadaan  Konversi Metadata   Kembali

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