Detail Four banking crises: Their causes and consequences Bibliografi Author: Leijonhufvud, Axel (Advisor); Vaz, Daniel Enrique Topik: ECONOMICS; GENERAL|ECONOMICS; FINANCE|ECONOMICS; HISTORY Bahasa: (EN )    ISBN: 0-599-10989-0     Penerbit: University of California     Tahun Terbit: 1998     Jenis: Theses - Dissertation Fulltext: 9912647.pdf (0.0B; 2 download) Abstract This dissertation studies four banking crises in the Southern Cone of South America. It provides historical accounts of the financial crises that erupted in Uruguay in 1965 and again in 1982, Argentina in 1980 and Chile in 1982, Then the antecedents of the crises as well as their development and lasting consequences are analyzed. Major political changes had preceded the crises. Reacting to previous policy failures, the new governments introduced new market-oriented macroeconomic programs. The liberalization of capital flows combined with inadequacies in bank regulation and supervision significantly amplified the booms and busts that followed. The banking systems expanded rapidly particularly in loan volume. While new entrants often lacked banking experience, the established banks lacked experience in the new, freer environment. Thus the initial cyclical upswings were fueled by credit expansions that were later to be proved unsound. All four crises were prompted by widespread insolvency problems in the private sector. This contrasts with the traditional banking literature that regards bank crises as typically due to liquidity problems arising from a maturity mismatch between the assets and liabilities of fractional reserve banks. Subsequently, in the two Uruguayan cases and in Argentina, the nationalization of the bad debts so destroyed the public finances as to cause lengthy periods of high inflation. The crises, when they arrived, were entirely unexpected. Policy makers and businessmen had to adapt to the unforeseen situations which they did not understand at all well. These episodes cannot therefore be characterized as rational expectations equilibrium processes. This is indicated most conclusively by the facts that the policies improvised in response to very similar crises differed widely, that remedial measures had no basis in pre-existing law, and that the regulatory frameworks were entirely overhauled in light of the crises experiences. The history of these crises throws doubt on the current enthusiasm for currency boards that are supposed to prevent a recurrence of such severe instability by rigidly constraining the public finances. The theoretical presupposition is that the government is the source of instability. But these four banking crises had their origin in the private sector. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Lihat Sejarah Pengadaan  Konversi Metadata   Kembali

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