Detail Capital markets and bank risk-taking Bibliografi Author: Kourelis, Angeliki ; Gorton, Gary (Advisor) Topik: ECONOMICS; FINANCE|BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION; BANKING Bahasa: (EN )    ISBN: 0-591-94092-2     Penerbit: University of Pennsylvania Press     Tahun Terbit: 1998     Jenis: Theses - Dissertation Fulltext: 9840210.pdf (0.0B; 2 download) Abstract In the first essay of this dissertation we examine the effciency of internal capital markets in banking by analyzing the allocation of equity capital within bank holding companies (BHCs). We test whether the parent channels capital to 'winners' or 'losers' by examining the characteristics of bank subsidiaries receiving equity capital infusions relative to the 'median bank' within the BHC. Our results indicate that there are substantial inefficiencies in the internal allocation of equity capital. We do not reach unambiguous conclusions regarding the effciency of internal capital markets as there is considerable variation among the banks receiving capital infusions. In the second essay we examine banks' decision to issue new shares. Banks which do not belong in BHCs do not have access to the internal capital markets described above, and must therefore raise capital externally. Asymmetric information theory predicts that firm financial slack, the net present value of assets-in-place and investment opportunities, the share of firm value demanded by outside investors as well as market conditions influence the extent of adverse selection and thus their decision to issue new shares. Our results indicate that financial slack is the primary factor influencing bank equity issues. Furthermore, banks, like nonfinancial firms, tend to issue after stock market and interest rate increases. In the third essay we examine the effectiveness of risk-based capital regulation in reducing bank credit risk. We consider changes in bank portfolio composition as proxies of bank credit risk. More specifically, we compare the portfolio choices of banks with capitalization above and below the regulatory minimum relative to those with capitalization around this minimum. Our results indicate that for medium and large banks the relationship between capitalization and subsequent credit risk is U-shaped. Thus, moral hazard prevails even after the introduction of risk-based regulation. In the case of small banks, however, our results suggest that risk-based regulation was effective in moderating the risk-taking of severely undercapitalized banks. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Lihat Sejarah Pengadaan  Konversi Metadata   Kembali

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