Detail Essays on corporate control and bank regulation Bibliografi Author: Bris, Arturo ; Vermaelen, Theo (Advisor) Topik: ECONOMICS; FINANCE|BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION; BANKING Bahasa: (EN )    ISBN: 0-591-89142-5     Penerbit: INSTITUT EUROPEEN D'ADMINISTRATION DES AFFAIRES (FRANCE)     Tahun Terbit: 1998     Jenis: Theses - Dissertation Fulltext: 9835678.pdf (0.0B; 1 download) Abstract When do bidders purchase a toehold? Theory and tests. My first essay explores the reasons why a potential bidder should abstain from acquiring the target firm's shares in the open market (toehold) before launching a bid. I show that the bidder's trading in the target stock drives up its price, therefore reducing the takeover premium (the difference between bid price and stock price few days before announcement) and making the bid less attractive. I test the model's predictions using a sample of 423 tender offer announcements from 22 different countries. I show that toehold size is negatively related to the probability of becoming a target; that stock price run-up depends directly on the size of the acquiror's toehold; and that bid premium and toehold size are negatively related. Debt, information acquisition, and the takeover threat. In this paper I formalize the information acquisition process by a potential bidder and its relationship with the target firm's capital structure. I show that debt increases are positively related to the precision of the bidder's information. Incumbent managers, by means of leverage, offset shareholders' losses derived from information acquisition about the firm's prospects by potential acquirors. I test the model with a sample of 739 U.S. targets of hostile tender offers, and show that informational variables are significant determinants of the decision to adjust leverage. The paper shows that target firms display slightly higher debt levels than their industry peers, and that target firms significantly reduce leverage in the year prior to the tender offer announcement. Bank capital requirements and managerial self-interest (joint with Salvatore Cantale). We analyze the effect of capital adequacy requirements on bank risk policy when managers and shareholders have different information about the quality of the loan portfolio. In a two-period model in which shareholders implement the optimal contract with managers, we show that the level of managerial effort (and therefore the quality of the loan portfolio, measured as the probability of repayment) is higher when shareholders cannot observe the manager's action. Thus we conclude that the riskiness of banks may be suboptimal under moral hazard. Our results are related to the theoretical and empirical literature that deals with the effects of the Basle Accords on the banks' credit policy. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Lihat Sejarah Pengadaan  Konversi Metadata   Kembali

Copyright © 2006, 2007 Unika Atma Jaya, all rights reserved