Detail Reputation as an asset Bibliografi Author: Tadelis, Steven ; Maskin, Eric (Advisor) Topik: ECONOMICS; THEORY Bahasa: (EN )    ISBN: 0-591-42902-0     Penerbit: Harvard University Press     Tahun Terbit: 1997     Jenis: Theses - Dissertation Fulltext: 9733418.pdf (0.0B; 4 download) Abstract The three chapters of this dissertation develop theoretical economic models to help us understand some of the forces at work when asymmetric information. In Chapter 1 I develop a model in which a firm's only asset is its name, and study the economic forces which cause names to be valuable, tradeable assets. A simple adverse selection model together with an assumption on the non-observability of shifts of ownership guarantees that in equilibrium the market for names is active. This result is robust to both finite and infinite horizons, in contrast to standard results in the reputation literature. I also show that situations in which only good types buy names with a good reputation cannot be sustained in equilibrium. Chapter 2 analyzes an adverse selection economy in which contracts are incomplete and assets are traded publicly: There is always full information as to who owns assets, yet there is uncertainty as to the productivity of the owners. Thus, ownership serves as a potential signaling device. We shown that asset ownership can partially solve the adverse selection problem-asset ownership serves as a separating signal, and there will be separation in equilibrium. Furthermore, assets need not affect the productivity of the agents for this result to hold. This can shed light on the fact that firms expand in directions which are not related to their original line of business. Chapter 3 considers a principal-agent relationship where a signal is available after the agent's choice of effort and renegotiation is possible after the signal is realized. The agent always observes the signal while the principal can choose whether to observe the signal. In this set-up the sufficient statistic result of the standard principal-agent theory does not hold: Optimal contracts may not include valuable information. In particular, when the signal is sufficiently informative about output the principal may choose not to observe the signal, thus creating endogenous asymmetric information and committing herself not to fully insure the agent at the renegotiation stage. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Lihat Sejarah Pengadaan  Konversi Metadata   Kembali

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