Detail The role of universal banks in overcoming financial constraints Bibliografi Author: Harm, Christian ; Saunders, Anthony (Advisor) Topik: BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION; BANKING|ECONOMICS; FINANCE Bahasa: (EN )    ISBN: 0-591-07837-6     Penerbit: NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION     Tahun Terbit: 1996     Jenis: Theses - Dissertation Fulltext: 9701517.pdf (0.0B; 0 download) Abstract This dissertation examines the universal banking system in Germany. Banks provide an entire spectrum of financial services to their corporate clients, and are often active in the governance of these firms. This governance role allows banks to participate in corporate restructurings, and may result in superior lending information, thereby reducing both information asymmetries and agency problems. This should reduce credit rationing. To test these hypotheses, I gathered a comprehensive database of financial statements of Germany's large industry dating from 1982 to 1988. I study the institutional, legal, and tax environment of banks in Germany, and come to the following conclusions: (a) Firms often have close ties to more than one bank. (b) The dominant form of banks' industrial relations is the board mandate. Equity stakes are less important, due to the closely held nature of Germany's large industry. (c) The legal bankruptcy triggers in Germany are activated very late, mandating timely intervention by banks with problem clients. (d) The two-tier board structure in Germany legally exempts banks from loan subordination after restructuring engagements. (e) The German tax code favors the creation of hidden reserves, and banks may assist firms in fully exploiting their tax write-off potential. Shareholders welcome this, since capital gains income enjoys a tax subsidy. In my empirical work, I find strong evidence that firms with bank ties have more stable investment records in times of financial distress, and that their investment performance can be traced to the provision of bank loans. I demonstrate that banks that hold blocking minority equity stakes in distressed client finns are more liberal in providing uncollateralized funds for firms' investments than for firms in which they only hold a board mandate or a smaller equity stake. Control (important for restructuring engagements)--but not privileged access to information--substitutes for collateral. Hence, access to a control infrastructure appears to be more effective in reducing agency costs. Comparisons of the restructuring role of Japanese 'main banks' and US financial capitalists of the early 20$/sp[/rm th]$ century further support this point. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Lihat Sejarah Pengadaan  Konversi Metadata   Kembali

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