Bidding into The Red: A Model of Post-Auction Bankruptcy  

Oleh:

Board, Simon

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Finance (EBSCO) vol. 62 no. 6 (Dec. 2007), page 2695-2723.
Topik: Bankruptcy
Fulltext: p 2695.pdf (187.21KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ88 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

Lihat Detail Induk

Isi artikel

This paper investigates auctions where bidders have limited liability. First, we analyze bidding behavior under different auction formats, showing that the second-prices auction induces higher prices, higher bankruptcy rates, and lower utilities than the first-price auction. Second, we show that the cost of bankruptcy critically affects the seller's preference over the choice of auction. If bankruptcy is very costly, the seller prefers the first-price auction over the second-price auction. Alternatively, if the bankrupt assets are resold among the losers of the initial auction, the seller prefers the second-price auction.

Opini Anda

Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini!

Kembali