Wittgenstein and the Social Context of an Individual Life  

Oleh:

Schatzki, Theodore R.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: History of the Human Sciences vol. 13 no. 1 (Feb. 2000), page 93–107.
Topik: constitution of the individual; practices; sociality; Winch; Wittgenstein
Fulltext: 93.pdf (190.85KB)

Isi artikel

This article argues that two significant implications of Wittgenstein’s writings for social thought are (1) that people are constitutively social beings and (2) that the social context of an individual life is nexuses of practice. Part one concretizes these ideas by examining the constitution of action within practices. It begins by criticizing three arguments of Winch’s that suggest that action is inherently social. It then spells out two arguments for the practice constitution of action that are extractable from Wittgenstein’s remarks. Part two contrasts the conception of the social context of individual life as practices with three historically significant conceptions of such a context: totality; sui generis reality; and abstract structure. It also circumscribes that contemporary movement – practice theory – that develops the Wittgensteinian position and represents, perhaps, his most significant legacy for social thought.

Opini Anda

Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini!

Kembali