Board Structure, Anti Take - Over Provisions, and Stockholder Wealth  

Oleh:

Sundaramurthy, Chamu ; Mahoney, James M. ; Mahoney, Joseph T.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Strategic Management Journal vol. 18 no. 3 (1997), page 231-246.
Topik: Structure; anti tske over provisions; board leadership; shareholder wealth

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: SS30.1 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

This paper's regression analyses from a sample of 261 firms that adopted 486 anti take over provisions (super majority, classified boards, fair - price, reduction in cumulative voting anti - greenmail and poison pills) in the 1984 - 88 period indicate that the negative market reactions to anti take over provisions vary depending on firms' board structures. This paper's empirical evidence indicates that while separating the positions of CEO and chairperson of the board reduces the negative effect, increased outsider representation increase negative market reactions.

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