Organized Factions and Disorganized Parties; Electoral Incentives in Uruguay  

Oleh:

Morgenstern, Scott

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Party Politics vol. 7 no. 2 (Mar. 2001), page 235–256.
Topik: electoral systems  factions  party organization  Uruguay
Fulltext: 235PP72.pdf (87.6KB)

Isi artikel

This paper extends the study of party organization and legislative voting to factionalized party systems. After developing a typology of factional types, it argues that hierarchically organized factions respond to a competing incentive system. Factions have interests that push them to work together for the good of the party, but at the same time they have interests in distinguishing themselves for electoral purposes. Further, the electoral cycle drives the weights of these competing pressures, leading factional cooperation to break down as elections near. These patterns and incentives are particularly evident in Uruguay, and the paper uses roll call data from that country’s legislature to test the propositions.

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