Elites and Agencies; Forging Labor Policy at China’s Central Level  

Oleh:

Johnston, M. Francis

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: Modern China vol. 28 no. 2 (Apr. 2002), page 147-176.
Topik: Forging Labor Policy at China’s Central Level
Fulltext: 147MC282.pdf (119.22KB)

Isi artikel

Central-level labor policy is the result of interactions between groups of elites as well as between bureaucratic agencies.1 Interactions, whether at the level of elites or of agencies, are frequently competitive. Doroth y Solinger (1984), Richard Baum (1994), and Joseph Fewsmith (1997, 1994) analyze how elite political contestation shapes the course of economic reforms, but no one has focused specifically on labor reform.Da vid Lampton, Kenneth Lieberthal, and Michel Oksenberg (Lampton, 1987; Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988; Lieberthal and Lampton, 1992; Hamrin and Zhao, 1995; Zhang, 1996) are among those who have shown the prevalence of “bureaucratic bargaining” in several arenas of economic policy, but there does not yet exist a similarly detailed analysis for labor policy. In this article, I unite elite analysis and bureaucratic bargaining to examine the creation of central-level labor policy in the post Mao period.

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