Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns  

Oleh:

Masulis, Ronald W. ; Cong Wang ; Fei, Xie

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Finance (EBSCO) vol. 62 no. 4 (Aug. 2007), page 1851-1890.
Topik: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; studies; corporate governance; stock exchanges; securities regulations; compliance; abnormal returns
Fulltext: p 1851.pdf (183.94KB)

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Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ88 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

We examine whether corporate governance mechanisms, especially the market for corporate control, affect the profitability of firm acquisitions. We find that acquirers with more antitakeover provisions experience significantly lower announcement - period abnormal stock returns. This supports the hypothesis that managers at firms protected by more antitakeover provisions are less subject to the disciplinary power of the market for corporate cotnrol and thus are more likely to indulge in empire - building acquisitions tht destou shareholder value. We also find that acquirers operating in more competitive industries or separating the positions of CEO and chairman of the board experience higher abnormal announcement returns.

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