Pay Me Later : Inside Debt and Its Role in Managerial Compensation  

Oleh:

Sundaram, Rangarajan K. ; Yermack, David L.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Journal of Finance (EBSCO) vol. 62 no. 4 (Aug. 2007), page 1551-1588.
Topik: Managerial; studies; executive compensation; debt; chief executive officers; pensions
Fulltext: p 1551.pdf (201.21KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: JJ88 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

Lihat Detail Induk

Isi artikel

Though widely used in executive compensation, inside debt has been almost entirely overlooked by prior work. We initiate this research by studying CEO pension arrangements in 237 large capitalization firms. Among our findings are that CEO compensation exhibits a balance between debt and equity incentives, the balance shifts systematically away from equity and toward debt as CEOs grow older, annual increases in pension entitlements represent about 10% of overall CEO compensation, and about 13% for CEOs aged 61 - 65, CEOs with high debt incentives manages their firms conservatively, and pension compensation influences patterns of CEO turnover and cash compensation.

Opini Anda

Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini!

Kembali