A Behavioral Agency Model of Managerial Risk Taking  

Oleh:

Gomez-Mejia, Luis R. ; Wiseman, Robert M.

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Academy of Management Review vol. 23 no. 1 (Jan. 1998), page 133-153.
Topik: risk; behavioural; agency model; managerial risk taking
Fulltext: AA11_23_01_Robert M. Wiseman.pdf (545.11KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: AA11.2 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

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Isi artikel

Building on agency and prospect theory views, we construct, in this article, a behavioural agency model of executive risk taking. In the model we combine elements of internal corporate governance with problem framing to explain executive risk - taking behaviour. The model suggests that executive risk taking varies across and within different forms of monitoring and that agents may exhibit risk - seeking as well as risk - averse behaviours. We develop specific propositions that combine monitoring with performance and the framing of strategic problems to explain executive choices of strategic risk. The resulting propositions enhance and extend the agency - based corporate governance literature on executive risk taking.

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