Employment Protection : Tough to Scrap or Tough to Get ?  

Oleh:

Brugemann, Bjorn

Jenis: Article from Journal - ilmiah internasional
Dalam koleksi: The Economic Journal (EBSCO) vol. 117 no. 521 (Jun. 2007), page F386-F415.
Topik: employment; employment protection; employment protection
Fulltext: F386.pdf (750.22KB)

Ketersediaan

Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: EE28.26 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada

Lihat Detail Induk

Isi artikel

If legislating employment protection is a protracted process subject to time delays, then firms can dismiss workers before an increase in protection is implemented. Heightened risk of dismissal before implementation makes workers in countries with flexible labour markets reluctant to support proposals for more stringent protection. In the model developed in this article, this mechanism provides a novel source of status quo bias which can sustain differences in employment protection across countries. While in previous work status quo bias arises because a constituency effect makes employment protection difficult to deregulate, here the bias arises because protection is difficult to introduce.

Opini Anda

Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini!

Kembali