Detail Moral Hazard and Secured Lending in An Infinitely Repeated Credit Market Game   Oleh:  Thakor, Anjan V. ; Boot, Arnoud W. A. Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW vol. 35 no. 4 (1994), page 899-920. Topik: MORAL HAZARD; moral hazard; credit market game Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: II49.4 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel We analyze repeated moral hazard with discounting in a competitive credit market with risk neutrality. Even without learning or risk aversion, long - term bank - borrower relationships are welfare enhancing. The main result is that the borrower obtains an infinite sequence of unsecured loans at below spot market cost following the first good project realization. This contract produces first - best action choices. Prior to this stage, the borrower gets secured loans with above - market borrowing cost. The optimal contract thus displays a "selective memory" feature, taking only one of two forms at any given point in time, depending on prior history. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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