Detail Myopic Investment Decisions and Competitive Labor Markets   Oleh:  Campbell, Tim S. ; Marino, Anthony M. Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW vol. 35 no. 4 (1994), page 855-876. Topik: LABOR MARKET; myopic investment; decision; labor markets Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: II49.4 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel This paper analyzes an agency problem where managers are able to control an unobservable variable which affects the time distribution of returns on a firm's investments. Managers have an incentive to select myopic investments in order to convince the labor market that they have relatively high ability. We demonstrate that if employment terms are determined in competitive labor markets and there are lower bounds on compensations, then at the principal's second best contract, managers make a myopic investment choice. We also characterize the structure of the principal's second best contract and conduct comparative statics at this solution. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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