Detail Why An Informed Principal May Leave Rents to An Agent   Oleh:  Beaudry, Paul Jenis: Article from Bulletin/Magazine Dalam koleksi: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW vol. 35 no. 4 (1994), page 821-832. Topik: AGENT; principal. agent Ketersediaan Perpustakaan Pusat (Semanggi) Nomor Panggil: II49.4 Non-tandon: 1 (dapat dipinjam: 0) Tandon: tidak ada     Lihat Detail Induk Isi artikel This paper characterizes incentive contracts for the situation where a principal is privately informed about the technology governing an agency relationship. In contrast to a standard principal - agent relationship, it is shown that a principal who values effort highly will choose to induce effort by paying a high base wage and low bonus payments. Moreover, the equilibrium contract has the principal transferring rents to the agent even though contracting possibilities are unrestricted and both principal and agent are risk neutral. Consequently, the informed - principal framework is shown to provide a rational for the payment of efficiency wages. Opini Anda Klik untuk menuliskan opini Anda tentang koleksi ini! Kembali

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